During the stay of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan, shortly after the conclusion of the war, a sizable number of official Japanese naval papers were recovered and returned to the Washington Document Center. The Naval Analysis Division of the Survey, in connection with its studies, arranged for the scanning of most of these documents and the fuller translation of some, but lack of qualified personnel has not yet permitted the complete coverage which a critical historical examination must later demand.

The document here presented in full is the action report by the C-in-C of the First Air Fleet, Admiral Nagumo, who was the commander of the Striking Force at Midway. As its title implies, this force contained the major offensive strength of the Combined Fleet, in its four aircraft carriers, and in fact conducted all the attack effort in this engagement. It was likewise the primary target of the United States forces involved. In the main, therefore, the action report of the Striking Force covers most of the detail of the historic Battle of Midway as seen from the Japanese side.

The Striking Force (variously titled Mobile Force, First Attack Force, and First Air Fleet) approached Midway from the northwest. The Occupation Force with landing troops embarked approached from the southwest. The Main Body, with Admiral Yamamoto, C-in-C Combined Fleet, took no part in the action, remaining to the westward prepared to meet such American threat to the concurrent operations in the Aleutians and at Midway as might develop.

There have been noted a number of obvious typographical errors in the original text, and several minor errors in fact particularly with respect to recognition of American aircraft types. In addition, there is sometimes difficulty in presenting an exact meaning in interpretation due to inherent peculiarities in Japanese naval phraseology.

It is suggested that the reader will benefit by reference to appropriate sections of "Interrogations of Japanese Officials" and "The Campaigns of the Pacific War" which have been published by the Naval Analysis Division of the Survey.

The arduous task of translating this document was accomplished by Mr. Fred Woodrough, Jr., of the Office of Naval Communications. Mr. Wood­rough accompanied the Naval Analysis Division to Japan where he served as the Senior interpreter and translator of that group.

PART I. EXISTING CONDITIONS AND TRENDS

1.  General Situation of the Enemy

Because of developments during the First Phase Operations, the enemy's outposts which he had relied on to be his first line of defense, collapsed one after another until he began to feel direct threats even to such areas as India, Australia, and Hawaii. The enemy was exerting every pressure to stem this tide by stepping up his submarine strength in the waters controlled by us and by increasing his air strength in the Australia area. He employed these to carry on guerrilla type tactics. Task force thrusts were also made in the Western and Southwestern Pacific.

These seemed to indicate that the enemy was planning on more positive actions than heretofore.

Subsequent to the beating he received in the Coral Sea on 7−8 May, the enemy was temporarily subdued, but by the end of May—by the time the Fleet was about to sortie from Hashira Jima—the enemy again began to show considerable life in all areas, particularly in the Australia area.

2.  Situation in the Midway Area

Midway acts as a sentry for Hawaii. Its importance was further enhanced after the loss of Wake and it was apparent that the enemy was expediting the reinforcing of its defensive installations, its air base facilities, and other military installations as well as the personnel. Estimate of existing conditions there were as follows:

(a)  Air strength:¹

The above estimated strength could be doubled in an emergency.

(b)  Strict Air Patrols were maintained both day and night to the West to a distance of about 600 miles. About three fighters covered the Island at all times.

(c)  Some surface vessels patrolled the area and some submarines were active to the West.

(d)  Of the enemy's carriers, the Ranger was apparently in the Atlantic. According to some prisoners' statements, the Lexington had been sunk. There were others, however, who claimed that she was under repair on the West Coast.

(e)  The Enterprise and the Hornet were definitely placed in the Pacific, but we could get no reliable information as to the whereabouts of the Wasp.

(f)  About six auxiliary carriers had been completed and there were indications that about half of this number were in the Pacific. However, they were known to be inferior in speed and could not be effectively employed for positive action.

¹ A fairly close estimate. Actually there were at Midway on June 3d 30 PBY's; representing two and a half squ­a­d­rons, one Marine Fighting Squadron of 28 planes, and one Marine Dive Bombing Squadron of 34 planes, plus 21 Army bombers (4 B−26's and 17 B−17's) and 6 Navy TBF's, which had been brought up from Hawaii.

(g)  Air strength in the Hawaii area was estimated to be as follows:

These could be used for the speedy reinforcement of Midway.

(h)  Enemy surface units in the Hawaii area were estimated to be in about the strength noted below. It was likely that these units would sortie in the event of an attack on Midway.

(i)  Shore Defense Installations on Midway.

Large numbers of various types of level and high angle large caliber guns as well as high angle machine guns had been installed. Marines had also been landed and all in all, the island was very strongly defended.

3. Mobile Force Commander's Estimate of the Situation

(a)  Although the enemy lacks the will to fight, it is likely that he will counter attack if our occupation operations progress satisfactorily.

(b)  The enemy conducts air reconnaissance mainly to the West and to the South but does not maintain a strict vigil to the Northwest or to the North.

(c)  The enemy's patrol radius is about 500 miles.

(d)  The enemy is not aware of our plans. (We were not discovered until early in the morning of the 5th at the earliest.)

(e)  It is not believed that the enemy has any powerful unit, with carriers as its nucleus, in the vicinity.

(f)  After attacking Midway by air and destroying the enemy's shore based air strength to facilitate our landing operations, we would still be able to destroy any enemy task force which may choose to counter attack.

(g)  The enemy's attempt to counterattack with use of shore based aircraft could be neutralized by our cover fighters and AA fire.

2.  High Command's Operation Orders

(a)  Secret Combined Fleet OpOrd #12. Combined Fleet's Second Phase Operation Order.

(b)  Secret Combined Fleet OpOrd #13. Communication plans of Combined Fleet for Second Phase Operation.

(c)  Secret Combined Fleet OpOrd #14. Coordination of Movements of Various Forces involved in the MI (Midway) and AL (Aleutians) Operations.

3.  Preparations for the Operation

Upon their return to home ports on 22 and 23 April, the ships immediately underwent repair and maintenance operations.

From the latter part of April, the carrier planes engaged in training at Kagoshima (Akagi), Kanoya (Kaga), Tomitaka (Hiryu), Kasanohara (Soryu), and Iwakuni (bomber leaders).

Float plane training was conducted at Ka­go­shi­ma from 6 May.

Although the flight training program was conducted without any major incident, since there had been a considerable turn-over in personnel, practically no one got beyond the point of basic training. Inexperienced fliers barely got to the point where they could make daytime landings on carriers. It was found that even some of the more seasoned fliers had lost some of their skill. No opportunity was available to carry out joint training, which, of course made impossible any coordinated action between contact units, illumination units, and attack units. The likelihood of obtaining any satisfactory results from night attacks, therefore, was practically nil.

(a)  Torpedo Attacks:

During the middle part of May, mock torpedo attacks were carried out, with judges from the Yokosuka Air Group acting as referees. The records during these tests were so disappointing that some were moved to comment that it was almost a mystery how men with such poor ability could have obtained such brilliant results as they had in the Coral Sea.

On 18 May, actual tests were made against Cru­Div 8 traveling at high speed. In spite of the fact that the speed was 30 knots with only 45-degree turns, the records made by the fliers were again exceedingly poor. With water depth at 40 to 50 meters, about a third of the torpedoes were lost.

(b)  Level Bombing:

Bomber leaders were concentrated at Iwakuni and practiced level bombing using the Settsu² as a target ship. The men attained a fair degree of skill, but they had no opportunity to participate in any formation bombing drills.

(c)  Dive Bombing:

Since the Settsu was limited to the waters in the vicinity of Naikai Seibu (Western Inland Sea) valuable time was wasted by the fliers in coming and going. The men could not participate in more than one dive bombing drill a day without seriously interfering with their basic training. Even this minimum practice could not be conducted satisfactorily because the men were kept busy with maintenance work.

² Settsu was an old decommissioned battleship of 21,000 tons used as a target for practice bombing.

(d)  Air Combat:

Men engaged in this phase were able to get no further than to actual firing and basic training for lone air combat operations. The more experienced were employed in formation air combat tactics, but even they were limited to about a three-plane formation.

(e)  Landing:

Since the carriers were undergoing repair and maintenance operations, the only available ship for take-off and landing drills was the Kaga. She was kept busy from early morning to nightfall but even at that the young fliers barely were able to learn the rudiments of carrier landings. The more seasoned fliers were given about one chance each to make dusk landings.

(f)  Night Flying:

Insofar as the weather permitted, men were trained in this phase every day. Due to maintenance needs and because of the limited time, only the very fundamentals were learned by the inexperienced fliers.

Because of the need for replacements and transfers of personnel, the combat efficiency of each ship had been greatly lowered. Moreover, since most of the ships were undergoing maintenance and repair work until only a few days before departure, the men's efficiency suffered greatly.

Training in group formations could not be satisfactorily conducted because of the limitation in time. This was particularly true of the newly formed DesRon 10. Some of the units in it underwent training as anti-air-screening ships, while others were assigned antisub duties. The squadron as a whole never had the opportunity to carry out joint drills.

That was the situation as far as fleet training was concerned. Added to this, we had practically no intelligence concerning the enemy. We never knew to the end where or how many enemy carriers there were. In other words, we participated in this operation with meager training and without knowing the enemy.

4.  Outline of Movements of Commander and Men
     During the Period of Preparation for the
     Operation

Since the Akagi was undergoing repairs, the Flag was transferred to the Kaga during the early part of May after instructions session with the Combined Fleet had been completed. The Flag was moved back to the Akagi during the middle of the month upon her return to Hashira Anchorage.

Because the Soryu was undergoing repairs, the Flag CarDiv 2 was transferred to the Hiryu at Sasebo during early May. Later the latter ship was permanently assigned as Flagship.

During the early part of May, CruDiv 8 assembled at Hashira Jima, and then in order DesRon 10, CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and the second section of BatDiv 3 arrived at the same anchorage. It was not until only a few days before the force was scheduled to sortie during the latter part of May, that all units were assembled.

On 24 May aircraft were taken aboard and on the 26th operation plans were agreed upon. At 0600 27 May the force departed for its operations area.

During this entire time, I³ was at Naikai Seibu (Western Inland Sea), directing training operations and attempting to coordinate intelligence.

1.  Direction of Operation by the Commander and
     his Movements

The Mobile Force departed Hashira Jima at 0600 27 May. Maintaining strict anti-sub screen and a rigid radio silence, the force headed for the area to the northwest of Midway following course 1 as given in Mobile Force Secret OpOrd 35.

On 1 and 2 June,⁴ all ships were refueled.

Visibility steadily decreased from about 1000 2 June so that by 2300 on the 3d, all ships were being navigated blindly. No visual signals could be employed during this period. Since there seemed little likelihood of the fog's lifting, the radio was used as a last resort at 1030 on the 3d (long wave) to give change of course.

Shortly after this, the fog lifted somewhat, making visual signals barely possible. By the morning of the 4th visibility on the surface improved greatly, but there were scattered clouds overhead.

At 1640 the Tone reported sighting about 10 enemy planes bearing 260 degrees. Three fighters immediately took off from the Akagi in pursuit of these but they were unable to sight the enemy. There is some element of doubt in the reported sighting.

At about 2330 on the same day, the Akagi twice sighted what was thought to be enemy planes weav-

³ Admiral Nagumo.

⁴ These Japanese dates of course would be reckoned as 31 May and 1 June in U.S. reports. It should be noted that all dates in this report and all times are in Tokyo time, Plus 9.

ing in and out of the clouds. All hands were immediately ordered to battle stations. There is con- siderable doubt as to the reliability of this sighting.

At 0130 on the 5th,⁵ under command of flight officer of the Hiryu, Lieut. Tomonaga, Organization #5 composed of 36 ship-based fighters, 36 ship-based bombers, and 36 ship-based torpedo planes, took off to attack Midway.

Between 0130 and 0200, 1 ship-based torpedo plane each from Akagi and Kaga, 2 Type 0 Float Recco each from Tone and Chikuma (distance 300 miles, to the left 60 miles) and 1 Type-95 Float Recco from the Haruna (distance 150 miles, to the left 40 miles), took off in search of enemy task forces to the South and to the East.

From about 0230, two to three enemy flying boats maintained continuous contact with us.

Shortly after taking off, the attack unit was contacted by enemy flying boats. When about 30 miles short of the target on Midway, the above mentioned flying boats suddenly dropped illumination bombs over our attack plane units to attract overhead cover fighters.

Thereafter, while engaging in bitter air combats, bombs were dropped on military installations on Midway between about 0345 and 0410. Fires resulted. All but 2 ship-based fighters, 1 ship-based bomber and 3 ship-based torpedo planes returned to their carriers by about 0600.

After our attack unit had taken off, enemy flying boats maintained contact with us. At about 0400 the first enemy wave attacked. From then until about 0730, the enemy attacked almost continuously. We counter attacked with fighters and AA fire and were able to bring most of the attackers down by 0645. About 30 carrier-based bombers then attacked us resulting in fires aboard the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, forcing them to fall behind and leaving only the Hiryu untouched.

Prior to this and subsequent to the take off of the initial attack unit, the fleet had Organization Number 4 (ship-based torpedo planes) stand by in readiness to act against any enemy surface vessels. However, at 0415, the command plane of the Hiryu radioed that:

"There is a necessity for carrying out a second attack (0400)."

It was decided, therefore, that a second attack would be directed against Midway. Orders were issued for the ship-based attack planes to remove their torpedoes and replace them with #80 land bombs.

⁵ June 4th by U. S. reckoning.

At about 0500, Tone's #4 plane reported:

"Sighted what appears to be the enemy composed of 10 (ships), bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway, on course 150 degrees, speed 20 knots (0428)."

Two subsequent reports concerning the weather (0440) and the enemy's course and speed (0455) were received but since we had not been advised of details, the plane was ordered to:

"Advise ship types."

At 0530, Tone's plane reported:

"The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier in a position to the rear of the others (0520)."

and again at about 0540:

"Sight what appears to be 2 cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance 250 miles from Midway; course, 150 degrees; speed 20 knots (0530)."

Thus, it was definitely established that enemy carriers were operating in the vicinity. The following dispatch was, therefore, sent to CinC Combined Fleet:

"(Info: CinC 2nd Fleet) At 0500, the enemy composed of 1 carrier, 5 cruisers, and 5 destroyers, was sighted in position bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway. We are heading for it."

Under orders issued at 0415, the ship-based attack planes were already being re-equipped with #80 land bombs which made immediate take-offs of the ship-based attack planes in Organization Number 4, impossible. It was therefore decided that we would await the return of the Midway attack unit and then carry out a grand scale air attack. The Fleet was advised as follows:

"After taking on the returning planes, we shall proceed north to contact and destroy the enemy task force."

This was sent at 0605.

In reply to this CarDiv 1 advised that its ship-based attack planes (torpedo equipped) would be ready for the take-off at 0730 and CarDiv 2 that its ship-based attack planes (to be equipped with torpedoes upon their return from the first attack), would be ready for the take-off by from 0730 to 0800. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to expedite completing preparations for the take-off of Organization Number 4. (Akagi: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based attack planes. Kaga: 3 ship-based fighters; 27 ship-based attack planes. Hiryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bom­bers. Soryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers).

While we were engaged in this, the enemy struck. Communication facilities were knocked out of all damaged ships. There was little likelihood of the fires being extinguished in the immediate future. For these reasons, I decided to direct the operations from the Nagara, and transferred to her at 0830.

After our ships had been damaged, the commander of CarDiv 2 decided to carry out the attack against the enemy carrier sighted by Tone's float recco plane. At 0758, Hiryu's attack unit (6 fighters and 18 bombers) took off and carried out the attack. Direct hits by 5 #25 ordinary and 1 land bombs were scored on an Enterprise class carrier, inflicting serious damage to her (possibly sinking her).

Prior to this, at 0530, a type 13 experimental ship-based bomber from the Soryu was ordered to maintain contact with the enemy carrier but due to break-down in radio facilities, it was not known until the return of this plane that, in addition to the aforementioned, there was a task force which had as its nucleus a carrier of the Enterprise class and another of the Hornet class. This task force was operating in waters to the north of the other one.

With this information at hand, the Hiryu attack unit (4 fighters and 9 torpedo planes, supplemented by 2 fighters from the Kaga and 1 torpedo plane from the Akagi) was ordered to the attack. Three torpedo hits were scored on a carrier of the Enterprise class, seriously damaging her. Heavy damages were also inflicted on a heavy cruiser of the San Francisco class.

Notes

Report of Chikuma's recco plane at 1413, 5th:

(a)  Sighted an enemy carrier of the Enterprise class listing and stopped in position 30−15N, l76−50W. (No evidence of fire. No damage to flight deck.) Three cruisers and 5 destroyers were in the vicinity. At about 1420, leaving the carrier on the scene, the others proceeded eastward on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots.

(b)  Sighted 2 enemy carriers (Yorktown or Hornet class) at 1510, in position 30−23N, 176−05W. Each was being directly escorted by 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Distance between the two groups, 3 miles; course 270 degrees; speed 12 knots.

(c)  Two other carriers (class undetermined) escorted by 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers sighted at 1516 in a position about 4 miles to the south of the others. Course 260 degrees, speed 12 knots.

(d)  Since the above sightings were made by the #2 plane while it was proceeding southward on a course of about 180 degrees from about 1500, and were seen one after another along this line, there is no chance of duplication.⁶ Moreover, sightings described in (b) and (c) above, were from below cloud level, or at about 300 meters altitude.

Judging from these reports, it seemed probable that the carrier damaged by torpedoes remained adrift until the following morning.

Subsequent searches failed to locate the carrier damaged by 5 ordinary bombs and 1 land bomb.

From these evidences, it was possible to estimate that one carrier was sunk by bombing while another was seriously damaged by torpedoes. The damaged carrier was sunk the following day by submarine torpedoes.

The three attacks resulted in the loss of most of Hiryu's attack unit. At 1240, she only had 6 fighters, 5 bombers, and 4 torpedo planes left. Contact was maintained, however, with Soryu's Type 13 experimental ship-based bomber (the plane which was ordered to the Hiryu because of fire on board the Soryu after returning from reconnaissance). Preparations were pressed for a fourth attack, aimed at the destruction of the Hornet class carrier.

During this time, the Hiryu had the planes of her air cover maintain constant cover. At 1403, at the very moment when a type 13 experimental ship-based bomber was about to take off, the Hiryu was subjected to dive bombing attacks from 13 enemy ship-based bombers. The Hiryu, also, broke out in flames.

Damages to our carriers up to this time were as follows:

(a)  AKAGI

The enemy attack unit which carried out a sustained attack from about 0400 was almost totally destroyed by friendly cover fighters. Up to 0650, our surface units had suffered practically no damage and the skies were clear of enemy planes.

At 0700, the second wave struck. Fourteen enemy torpedo planes, splitting into two groups approached from the northwest. One group carried out a torpedo attack against the Kaga and was followed up with several planes dive-bombing her.

At 0706, enemy torpedo planes were sighted bearing 118 degrees. To minimize the target area, the Akagi turned to course 300 degrees and stayed on this course. At a time when all of our surface

⁶ There was duplication, nevertheless. The carriers sighted, of course, were Enterprise and Hornet.

units had maneuvered themselves into maximum defense against the torpedo planes, enemy dive bombers were suddenly noted among the clouds overhead at 0726. Resorting to evasive tactics, every effort was made to avoid the bombs, but one direct hit was sustained on the aft rim of the lift amidship and another on the rear guard of the port flight deck. (Neither were fatal hits.)

Since the Akagi was at the time preparing to carry out the second attack, the fire spread over the entire hangar area and with induced explosions, the fire gradually moved from the aft quarters, forward with great intensity, spreading even to the immediate vicinity of the bridge.

Ammunition rooms were immediately ordered flooded, and all hands were ordered to fire-fighting stations. The pump system aboard, however, failed to function and it became apparent that the fire would not be extinguishable in the immediate future. The headquarters, therefore, was moved to the Nagara at 0746. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to bring the fire under control but it became increasingly evident that there would be little hope of success.

At 1038, the Emperor's portrait was transferred to the destroyer Nowake. By 1620, the situation was deemed hopeless, and the captain of the Akagi decided to order all hands to abandon ship. A report to that effect was made to the commander of the Mobile Force and the order was issued at 1625. Personnel began transferring to the destroyers Arashi and Nowake at 1700. At 1925 CinC Combined Fleet ordered: "Delay disposition." While standing by awaiting further orders, CinC Combined Fleet ordered: "Dispose," at 0150 on the 6th. In accordance with this order, the ship was scuttled at 0200, in position 30−30N, 178−40W.

(b)  KAGA

Against enemy torpedo plane attacks which were carried out after 0400, AA fire and evasive action proved completely successful. While still engaged in evasive action at about 0715 against the persistent enemy torpedo planes, 9 enemy dive bombers were suddenly sighted among the clouds at 0722. Every effort was made to counter these through evasive action and AA fire cover. These efforts were successful against the first, second, and third bombs, but #4 hit starboard, aft, while #7 was a direct hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Glass on the bridge was shattered and because of the smoke from the bombs, visibility from that point was reduced to zero. The captain ordered emergency steering apparatus put in operation. Bomb #8 hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Practically nothing of the bridge remained after this hit. All persons who were on the bridge at the time, including the captain, were killed in action. Bomb #9 also hit amidship. Fire-fighting was conducted under the direction of the air officer, but since there seemed to be little hope of getting the fire under control, the Emperor's portrait was transferred to the Hagikaze at 1025. The situation became hopeless by 1340 and all hands were ordered to abandon ship. They were transferred to the destroyers Hagikaze and Maikaze. The fire on board spread to both the forward and aft fuel tanks by 1625, causing two great explosions and the ship's sinking. Position of Kaga's sinking: 30−20.3N, 179−17.2W.

(c)  HIRYU

Fire broke out as a result of dive-bombing attacks by 13 enemy dive bombers at 1403. From then until 1803 she resorted to evasive action under battle speed #1, while efforts were made to escape from the battle area and to fight fires. The flames could not be brought under control, however, and the fires killed one man after another in the engine rooms until further operation of the ship became impossible. Telephone communications with the engine rooms were maintained until the last. The manner in which the engine room personnel from Engineer Commander Kunizo Aimune down to the last man, carried on in the face of death which finally overtook them, can only be described as heroic.

The ship's list, due to shipping water, constantly increased to about 15 degrees.

At 2058, it seemed as if the fires might be brought under control, but at that time there was another induced explosion and the fierce fires were rekindled. It became evident that further fire-fightng operations were useless and all hands were ordered to prepare to abandon ship at 2330. At 2350 Captain Tomeo Kaki and Squadron Commander Rear-Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi delivered messages to the crew. This was followed by expressions of reverence and respect to the Emperor, the shouting of Banzai's, the lowering of the battle flag and command flag. At 0015, all hands were ordered to abandon ship, His Imperial Highness' portrait removed, and the transfer of personnel to the destroyers Kazagumo and Makigumo put underway. The transfer of portrait and men was completed at 0130.

After completion of the transfer operations, the Division Commander and Captain remained aboard ship. They waved their caps to their men and with complete composure joined their fate with that of their ship.

At 0210 the Hiryu was scuttled by torpedo (1) from the Makigumo. Position of Hiryu's scuttling: 31−27.5N, 179−23.5W.

(d)  SORYU

The Soryu was attacked by 13 dive bombers from 0725. Three hits were scored on her at 0725, 0726, and 0728. By 0730, the fires quickly spread and caused induced explosions from the bomb-storage room, torpedo-storage room, AA and machine-gun-ammunition rooms as well as from gasoline tanks. Fires enveloped the entire ship in no time. By 0740 both engines had stopped. At 0743, attempts were made to steer her, but with the entire ship in flames, she was helpless. "Abandon ship" was ordered at 0745.

While most of the officers and men, including the Executive officer, had congregated on deck, having been forced to leave their posts due to the flames, a terrific explosion occurred. The explosion sent them flying into the water.

Every effort was made to pick these men up and put them on the forward deck. Medical aid was given those needing it there. Transfers to the destroyers Hamakaze and Isonami were completed at about 1600.

As soon as the fires broke out aboard ship, the captain, Ryusaku Yanagimoto, appeared on the signal tower to the starboard of the bridge. He took command from this post and pleaded that his men seek shelter and safety. He would allow no man to approach him. Flames surrounded him but he refused to give up his post. He was shouting "Banzai" over and over again when heroic death overtook him.

Fires died down somewhat by about 1600, and the air officer who was the acting commander, or- ganized fire fighters with the intention of reboard- ing the ship. However, the ship sank⁷ at 1613 and there was a great underwater explosion at 1620.

Position: 30−42.5N, 178−37.5W.

At 0828, after the headquarters had been transferred to the Nagara, a plane from the Chikuma reported: "The enemy is in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles from us (0810)." It was decided that the enemy would be destroyed in a daytime attack. Therefore, the following order

⁷ Actually the coup de grace was administered by the U. S. submarine Nautilus.

was issued at 0853: "We are now going to attack. Assemble." At 0900, our course was set at 60 degrees, speed 16 knots; at 0945, course 0 degrees, speed 20 knots; 1000, speed 24 knots.

At 1045, the enemy changed its course to 90 degrees and the opportunity for battle seemed to be close at hand. Somewhat later, Tone's #4 plane reported: "The enemy is in position bearing 114 degrees, distance 110 miles from my position of 1230." From this it became evident that the enemy was trying to put distance between himself and us.

It was deemed that if under these conditions, the enemy chose to strike, we would be at a distinct disadvantage in that we would be unable to carry out a decisive battle.

We, therefore, turned about and proceeded westward, with the expectation of destroying the enemy in a night encounter.

Prior to this, at 1120, the following order was issued to the Second Mobile Force:

"The First Mobile Force is in (grid) position TO E WO 33 at 1100, 5th. After destroying enemy striking force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. The Second Mobile Force will rendezvous with us as soon as possible. Our (grid) position at 1130 will be: YU YU KE 44, on course 285, speed 24 knots. Plan to rendezvous with Landing Force at 1600."

While thus laying plans for the night attack, the Hiryu also broke out in flames at 1405. That meant that while all four of our carriers had been lost, the enemy had at least one. Moreover, as long as we were in the operational radius of their shore-based air, we would be at a very distinct disadvantage.

By 1433, the enemy began to retreat to the east on course 70, speed 20 knots, which further reduced our hopes for a night engagement. However, we still were determined to carry it out. Nagara's plane was ordered to prepare for a take-off and all the ships were ordered to assemble in the vicinity of the Nagara. At 1450, CinC Second Fleet, issued the orders for the night battle.

At 1530, the commander of DesDiv 4 ordered the destroyers under his command to stand by the various carriers assigned to them and to protect them from enemy submarines and task forces.

At about this time the commander of the Chikuma made the following report: "This ship's #2 plane reports that at about 1530 he sighted 4 enemy carriers, 6 cruisers and 15 destroyers proceeding westward in a position about 30 miles east of the listing and burning enemy carrier."

This was the first inkling we had of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's carrier strength. Since we were not able to maintain contact with this task force after sundown, our hopes of a successful night engagement were further reduced.

At 1615, the following order was received from CinC Combined Fleet:

"1. The enemy task force has retired to the east. Its carrier strength has practically been destroyed.

"2. The Combined Fleet units in that area, plan to overtake and destroy this enemy, and, at the same time, occupy AF (Midway).

"3. The Main Body was in position (grid) FU ME RI 32 at 0000, 6th. Course 90 degrees, speed 20 knots.

"4. The Mobile Force, Occupation Force (less CruDiv 7) and Advance Force [Submarine] will contact and destroy the enemy as soon as possible."

It was evident that the above message was sent as a result of an erroneous estimate of the enemy, for he still had 4 carriers in operational condition and his shore-based air on Midway was active. Therefore, the following message was sent:

"Mobile Force Secret despatch #560.

"Enemy has a total of 5 carriers, 6 cruisers, and 15 destroyers which are proceeding west from the vicinity of (grid) position TO SU WA 15 (at 1530). While offering protection to the Hiryu we are retiring northwestward. Speed 18 knots. 1830 (grid) position: FU N RE 55."

Although we had already reported the existing situation, we again sent the following despatch at 1950:

"The enemy still has 4 carriers (may include special type carriers), 6 cruisers, and 15 destroyers which are at present proceeding westward. All the carriers of our force have become inoperational. We plan to contact the enemy with float reconnaissance planes tomorrow morning."

A follow-up message reading: "Mobile Force Secret despatch #562. Re Mobile Force Secret Despatch #561: 2 of the carriers involved are of the Hornet class, speed 24 knots. Type of the other two are unknown," was sent.

We were not in contact with the enemy at that time and our destroyers had been assigned to the damaged carriers. Moreover, the enemy was approximately 100 miles away which made a night engagement by us almost out of the question. Every effort, instead, was made to save the Hiryu.

At 2040, the following order was received from ComOccupation Force:

"Second Fleet Secret Despatch #761.

"1. The support for the Occupation Force reached position (grid) TO E WA 12 at 0000, 6th. We plan to carry out searches to the east and to participate in the night attack described in Mobile Force's Secret Despatch #560.

"2. The Mobile Force (excepting the Hiryu, Akagi, and their respective escorts), will immediately turn about and participate in the Occupation Force's night engagement."

While complying with the orders issued by the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet, orders were received from the Combined Fleet to rendezvous, which were complied with.

The following was received from the Combined Fleet at 0430, 6th:

"Has the Hiryu sunk? Advise situation and position."

So, it became evident that the Hiryu's sinking was not as yet certain to CinC Combined Fleet. Moreover, a friendly plane reported that the Hiryu was still afloat. Therefore, a plane from the Nagara was sent out in search for her and at the same time the destroyer Tanikaze was despatched to dispose of her. Neither could sight the target, so it is assumed that she had sunk.

From about 1500, 6th, the Tanikaze was subjected to attacks from about 50 enemy planes. She fought well without any support from any other units, and managed to down 4 of the enemy planes.

The carrier of the Yorktown type which had been hurt by our efforts (apparently no damage had been inflicted on her flight deck) was definitely sunk by subsequent submarine action.

2.  Outline of Events (Excerpts).

 3 June

3. Actual Condition of the Enemy

(a)  Actual conditions in the Midway area:

The enemy apparently anticipated our attack and had their attack planes and flying boats take off. They also concentrated about 50 fighters (all Grummans), and intercepted our first attack wave at a point approximately 30 miles short of our target. When we subjected these to fierce counterattacks, however, they were put on the defensive and engaged, for the most part, in evasive maneuvers. Our ship-based attack planes and bombers suffered no casualties from enemy interceptors while the greater part of their fighters were brought down by us. Results we obtained were 41 enemy ship-based fighters, 1 ship-based bomber and 1 float recco shot down. We lost 4 planes from the exceedingly hot enemy AA fire, so our total losses including 2 which were scuttled during air engagements, were 6 planes.

Twelve bomb hits were scored by us on two enemy runways with #80 land bombs, but these were insufficient to render them inoperational, since the large shore-based attack planes were very active subsequently. We are of the opinion that it is impractical to attempt to render such air fields as these inoperational through bombings.

Intelligence obtained from enemy POW's with regards to Midway is as follows (POW taken aboard the Makigumo):

(1)  POW's names and ranks:

   Ensign.⁸

   Aviation Machinist Mate.

(2)  Defenses of Midway:

(i)   About 5,000 Marines. No Army troops.

(ii)  About 150 planes.

   Fighters (Grummans and Buffalos) _____ 55

   Bombers (B-18's)__________________50

   Flying Boats (Consolidated PBYs) ______ 30

(iii)  There are gun emplacements along the entire perimeter of the island. Guns are 20 mm., 30 mm., 50 mm., and 5-inch, of which the 20 mm.'s are the most numerous.

(iv)  There are 5 torpedo boats in the harbor.

(v)   The air field on Eastern Island is situated at the northern tip and is built in a triangular shape. Runways are 200 feet wide and 3,000 feet long.

(vi)  Flying boats carry out air patrols to a distance of 700 miles each morning and evening. They are out for 14 hours each.

(3)  Midway has never been used as a carrier base.

(4)  The Alabama has apparently recently been commissioned.

(5)  The United States apparently does not announce losses of her carriers.

(6)  Douglas SBD's are used for patrol planes as well as dive bombers.

(b)  Enemy carriers:

Our search planes were scheduled to take off at 0130 or 30 minutes before dawn, but the take offs of the float recco planes were delayed as shown below:

⁸ Ed. Note. Names given, but are purposely omitted from this translation.

Moreover, as can clearly be seen by the search chart, the search plane on #5 search line which should have sighted the enemy failed to do so while the plane on #4 search line sighted him at 0428 while on his return run and reported it as follows: "Sight what appears to be the enemy composed of 10 ships in position bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway. He is on course 150 degrees, speed 20 knots. (0428.)" Subsequently he advised us of the weather conditions in the vicinity of the enemy, and again that "The enemy has changed to course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots." Since, however, he failed to report on the type of ships that he had sighted, he was ordered to do so. At 0509 he reported that the enemy was composed of 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers and again at 0520 that the above formation was accompanied by what appeared to be a carrier to its rear. This was the first reference to an enemy carrier. Subsequent to this and until the ship based recco plane returned, we received conflicting reports, numbering the carriers at three, making it impossible for us to estimate the enemy strength.

Later, at 0910, 4 fighters and 18 bombers from CarDiv 2 (less Soryu) bombed and sunk (seriously damaged) an enemy carrier. At 1000, it was learned from an enemy POW who was an air crew member from the Yorktown, that 3 carriers; namely, Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet were in the vicinity. This information together with our air recco made it possible for us to estimate that the enemy carrier strength was 3.

At 1145, 6 fighters and 10 torpedo planes from the Hiryu carried out the second attack on enemy carriers and succeeded in seriously damaging (sinking) another carrier.

This should have left only 1 enemy carrier in a healthy condition. But at 1530, the captain of the Chikuma reported that according to his #2 plane, there were 4 enemy carriers, 6 cruisers, and 15 destroyers in position about 30 miles to the east of the listing and burning enemy carrier. This sighting was made at 1413. The ships were reportedly proceeding westward.

Then we were at a complete loss as to estimating the number of remaining enemy carriers.

The enemy carrier which was bombed by us at 0910 was hit with 5 #25 ordinary and 1 #25 land bomb. Judging from the hour of the enemy's first attack on us, it is estimated that he was preparing for his second attack wave. Therefore, we probably inflicted considerable damage on him.

Subsequent searches failed to locate the damaged carrier so the probability of its sinking is very good. The damaged carrier which was located by Chikuma's #4 plane at 0352 on the 6th and later sunk by our submarine was most likely the carrier torpedoed by our planes at 1145, judging from the fact that her flight decks were undamaged.

Pertinent facts concerning the POW picked up by the Arashi, and his testimony were as follows:

His plane which was from the U.S. carrier Yorktown, was shot down in position 30-30N, 178-40W on 5 June. He died on 6 June and was buried at sea. The following information was obtained from him:

(1)  POW's name and rank:⁹

(2)  Place of birth: Chicago.

(3)  Age: 23.

(4)  Point of debarkation: Pearl Harbor.

(5)  Destination: Vicinity of Midway.

(6)  Other items:

(i)   Enemy task force strength:

      3 carriers (Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet).

      6 cruisers; about 10 destroyers.

(ii)  The Yorktown, 2 cruisers, and 3 destroyers formed one group, and was separated from the other forces.

(iii) Sortied from Pearl Harbor during the morning of 31 May, arriving in the vicinity of Midway on 2 June. Since then, this group had been carrying out a mobile patrol along a north-south line.

(iv) There were no battleships in Pearl Harbor on 31 May. (The POW engaged in base training until 31 May, and therefore had no detailed knowledge of battleship movements in the Hawaii area.)

(v)  Air strength on the island of Oahu:

(vi) Base for carrier plane drills: Kaneohe, on Oahu.

(vii) Types (numbers) of aircraft on the Yorktown: Bombers (18); Recco (18); Torpedo planes. (12); Fighters (27).

⁹ Ed. Note. Names given, but are purposely omitted from this translation.

(Reference material):

Matters pertaining to battleships (in Hawaii area):

(i)   Apparently no battleships have arrived since the outbreak of hostilities.

(ii)  As for the subsequent movements noted in the above table, they are all this POW's guesses.

(c)  Enemy air attacks are described in Supplementary Table #3; the number shot down are shown in Supplementary Table #4.

4. Conditions and Circumstances Which Affected
    the Operation.

(a)  Weather:

(1)  Visibility gradually became worse from 2 June until we were completely closed in. All the heavier ships, not to mention the destroyers, were forced to participate in the operation without a full load of fuel.

(2)  We were still fog-bound on the morning of 3 June. Were we to proceed on our course and speed, we would be unable to meet the operation schedule for N-day. We finally broke radio silence, therefore, at 1030 to order a change of course. We presume that this gave the enemy an opportunity to detect us. The fog lifted somewhat by 1250, but this was after we had gone on the air.

(3)  During the search carried out on 5 June, Chikuma's #1 plane failed to sight the large enemy force which should have been sighted. Although, of course, it is deemed essential that strict lookouts should be maintained along lines at right angles to the course of the plane, it is quite possible in view of the prevailing weather conditions, that the enemy was obscured from vision by clouds. Even if Tone's #4 plane had sighted this enemy on his outward flight (Tone's #4 plane's take-off had already been delayed by twenty to thirty minutes), we could have carried out an operation with the advantage with us. The weather of the day certainly was not a friend of our search planes.

Under such weather conditions, it is believed that the number of recco planes should be increased.

(4)  After 0400, the enemy took advantage of existing clouds in contacting us. This delayed our sighting them. Enemy dive bombers, in particular, seem to very frequently come to the attack from behind clouds, placing us in a very disadvantageous position.

(b)  Communication:

Tone's #4 plane's message, reporting the sighting of the enemy, was filed at 0428 but was not delivered until about 0500. Hiryu's Air Officer's message stating that there was a need for a second attack wave was filed at 0400 and delivered 4 or 5 minutes later. The messages ordering the carrying out of the second attack wave today, and to have the stand-by planes change from torpedoes to bombs, were all delivered by 0415. The delay in the delivery of message from Tone's #4 plane greatly affected our subsequent attack preparations.

5.  Outstanding Events During the Operation

(a)  Attack on Midway:

(Hiryu Attack Unit)
Date: 5 June

Weather: cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: Neutralization of AA fire; attacks on air field and installations on Sand Island.

Commander: Lieut. Tomonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Under direct command.

Commander on base carrier: Under direct command.

Type and number of aircraft: 17 ship-based attack planes.

Base: Hiryu.

Air combat: Engaged by enemy F4F's for 15 minutes about 40 miles short of Midway at 0316. Three enemy planes were shot down, and we lost two during this encounter.

Weather at scene of target: Clear; amount of cloud, 1 to 2; ceiling, 500 meters; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Ammunition expended: 17 #80¹⁰ 10 land bombs; 5,238 rounds of 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets. Time of attack and results obtained: Bombing attack carried out at 0334 from an altitude of 3,400

¹⁰ Bomb types mentioned on this and succeeding pages are as follows: No. 25 land bomb, total weight 242 kg.; No. 25 ordinary bomb, total weight 250 kg.; for use against ships; No. 80 land bomb, total weight 805 kg.

meters. Squadron 1 scored a hit on the fuel storage tank at the northeast tip of Sand Island; squadron 2 attacked and partially destroyed an AA gun emplacement on the east side of Sand Island; squadron 3 destroyed a flying boat take-off platform on Sand Island. Losses: Two in air engagement and two from AA guns.

(Soryu attack unit.)
Date: 5 June.

Weather: Cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: Neutralization of AA fire; attacks on airfield and installations on Sand Island.

Commander: Lieut. Tomonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Under direct command.

Commander on base carrier: Lieut. Abe, Soryu's Division Commander.

Type and number of aircraft: 18 ship-based attack planes.

Base: Soryu.

Air combat: Encountered 30 to 40 F4F-3's at a point about 20 miles from Midway. Three (of which one uncertain) enemy F4F-3's shot down.

Weather at scene of target: Clear; amount of cloud, 1 to 2; ceiling, 500 meters; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Ammunition expended: 18 #80 land bombs; 4,510 rounds of 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets.

Time of attack and results obtained: Bombing attacks were carried out between 0334 and 0335. Squadron one attacked and silenced an AA gun emplacement on Sand Island (altitude: 2,700 meters); squadron two destroyed a runway on Eastern Island Airfield (altitude: 3,400 meters) squadron three attacked hangars on Eastern Island, setting one on fire and also setting one B-17 on fire.

Losses: 1 from aircraft; all planes had bullet holes.

(Akagi fighters)
Date: 5 June.

Weather: Cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: To attack enemy aircraft both in the air and on the ground.

Commander: Lieut. Tomonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Soryu Division Commander, Lieut. Suganami.

Commander on base carrier: Akagi Division Commander, Lieut. Shirane.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 9 ship-based fighters.

Base: Akagi.

Air combat: (1)  From 0320 to 0340, engaged 3 enemy Grumman fighters flying 10 meters apart at an altitude of 4,500 meters. Two of the enemy were shot down.

(2)  At 0320 two Grummans were shot down while flying at an altitude of 3,700 meters in the vicinity of Eastern Island. A coordinated attack was made by two Grummans at 0340 and they were both shot down (uncertain).

(3)  Engaged 3 Grummans at 0320 and shot down two.

(4)  Engaged 3 Grummans at 0320 and shot down one.

(5)  Engaged 1 Grumman at 0320 and shot him down.

(6)  Engaged 2 Grummans at 0320 and shot one down.

Weather at scene of target: Clear; amount of cloud, 1 to 2; ceiling, 500 meters; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Ammunition expended: 880 20 mm. machine gun bullets; 3,650 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets.

Fuel Consumed: 5.29 kiloliters.

Results Obtained: (1)  At 0320 seriously damaged one B-17 on the ground.

(2)  At 0330 machine-gunned but failed to set afire one B-17.

Summary of results: 1 B-17 seriously damaged; 11 Grumman fighters shot down (2 of which are uncertain).

Losses: 1 in the air; 3 planes suffered hits.

(Kaga fighters)
Date: 5 June

Weather: Cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: To attack enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground.

Commander: Lieut. Tomonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Soryu Division Commander, Lieut. Suganami.

Commander on base carrier: Kaga division Commander, Lieut. Iizuka.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 9 ship-based fighters.

Base: Kaga.

Air Engagements: Shot down 9 Grummans, 2 bombers, and 1 float recco plane over Midway at about 0320.

(2)  At about 0510, 1 enemy bomber shot down while preparing to land on carrier. (Air cover result.) Results Obtained: 1 fighter and 1 B-17 strafed on the ground and destroyed; over 9 fighters, 2 bombers and 1 float recco plane shot down. Losses: 1 in the air; 1 from AA fire; 1 person other than those on lost planes, killed.

(Hiryu fighters)
Date 5 June.

Weather: Cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: To attack enemy planes in the air and on the ground at Midway.

Commander: Lieut. Tomonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Soryu Division Commander, Lieut. Suganami.

Commander on base carrier: Hiryu Division Commander, Lieut. Shigematsu.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 9 ship-based fighters.

Base: Hiryu.

Air Engagements: Engaged 30 to 40 Grumman fighters from 0317 to 0332 and shot down 18 (of which 4 uncertain). After returning to carrier, engaged a group of enemy attack planes over the carrier.

Weather in Target Area: Clear; amount of cloud, 1 to 2; ceiling, 500 meters; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Ammunition Expended: 990 20 mm. machine gun bullets; 6,000 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets.

Results Obtained: 18 Grummans (of which 4 uncertain) shot down.

Losses: 9 suffered hits (of which 2 became inoperational).

(Soryu fighters)
Date: 5 June.

Weather: Cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: To attack enemy planes in the air and on the ground at Midway.

Commander: Lieut. Tomonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Soryu Division Commander, Lieut. Suganami.

Commander on Base Carrier: Under direct command.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 9 ship-based fighters.

Base: Soryu.

Air Engagements: While escorting our attack planes, a dozen or more enemy Grummans were engaged at a point bearing 20 degrees, distance 15 miles from Midway, at an altitude of 3,500 meters. The enemy was destroyed.

(1)  15th Section: Coordinated action brought down 2 enemy fighters in position bearing 30 degrees, distance 5 miles from Midway, at an altitude of 2,000 meters, at 0325. Another, making a total of 3 was shot down over the airfield at a height of 200 meters.

(2)  17th Section: 1 enemy fighter shot down at position bearing 60 degrees, distance 5 miles from Midway at 0327.

(3)  17th Section: While acting as direct cover for our attack planes, an enemy Grumman was attacked but it was not brought down.

(4)  While over our carrier, sighted 10 enemy B-17's proceeding southward. These were attacked, but none were brought down.

Weather in Target Area: Clear; amount of clouds, 1 to 2; ceiling, 500 meters; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Results Obtained: Definitely shot down: By coordinated action, 3; by individual action, 1. Uncertain: 2.

Losses: None.

(Akagi bombers)
Date: 5 June.

Weather: Cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: To attack hangars and other airfield installations on Eastern Island.

Commander: Lieut. Komonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Kaga Division Commander, Lieut. Ogawa.

Commander on Base Carrier: Akagi Division Commander, Lieut. Chihaya.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 18 ship-based bombers.

Base: Akagi.

Air Engagements: None.

Weather in Target Area: Clear; amount of clouds 1 to 2; ceiling, 500 meters; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Ammunition Expended: 18 #25 land bombs.

Fuel Consumed: 14.4 kiloliters of AvGas.

Results Obtained: 3 hangars on Eastern Island Airfield set afire.

Losses: None.

(Kaga bombers)
Date: 5 June.

Weather: Cloudy; amount of clouds, 8; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 40 kilometers.

Mission: To attack flying boat hangars and surface ships on and around Sand Island.

Commander Lieut. Tomonaga, Air Officer of the Hiryu.

Group Commander: Kaga Division Commander, Lieut. Ogawa.

Commander on Base Carrier: Under direct command.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 18 ship-based bombers.

Base: Kaga.

Air Engagements: None.

Weather in Target Area: Clear; amount of clouds, 1 to 2; ceiling, 500 meters; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Ammunition Expended: 18 #25 land bombs.

Results Obtained: 9 hits with #25's scored on flying boat hangars on Sand Island between 0340 and 0343, setting off large fires; 1 oil tank set afire.

Losses: 1 plane lost; 4 planes hit.

(b)  First Attack on Enemy Carriers:

(Hiryu bombers)
Date: 5 June.

Weather: Clear; amount of clouds, 2; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 70 kilometers.

Mission: To carry out first attack on enemy carriers.

Commander: Hiryu Division Commander, Lieut. Kobayashi.

Group Commander: Under direct command.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 18 ship-based bombers.

Base: Hiryu.

Air Engagements: Fierce engagements were carried out between 0858 and 0940, during which 2 certain and 1 uncertain enemy Grumman fighters were shot down.

Weather in Target Area: Clear; amount of clouds, 2; ceiling, 500 to 1,000 meters; visibility, 70 kilometers.

Ammunition Expended: 12 #25 ordinary bombs; 6 #25 land bombs; 2,854 rounds of 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets.

Results Obtained: Between 0908 and 0912, 5 hits with #25 ordinary and 1 with #25 land bombs were scored on an Enterprise class carrier, setting her afire and causing her to later explode.

Losses: 13 planes "self-exploded."

(Hiryu fighters)

Date and Weather: Same as above.

Commander: Hiryu Division Commander, Lieut. Kobayashi.

Group Commander: Hiryu Division Commander, Lieut. Shigematsu.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 6 ship-based fighters. (Note: 2 of these engaged enemy torpedo planes and did not participate in the attack on the carriers.)

Base: Hiryu.

Air Engagements: A fight to the death was carried out against enemy Grumman fighters between 0858 and 0940. Five of them were definitely shot down and there were two uncertains.

Weather in Target Area: Same as above. Ammunition Expended: 660 20 mm. machine gun bullets; 3,900 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets.

Results Obtained: 5 shot down (2 others, uncertain ).

Losses: 3 planes "self-exploded."

(c)  Second Attack on Enemy Carriers:

(Hiryu attack)
Date: 5 June.

Weather: Clear; amount of clouds, 4; ceiling, 3,000 meters with some clouds at 500 meters; visibility, 70 kilometers.

Mission: To carry out second attack on enemy carriers.

Commander: Hiryu Air Officer, Lieut. Tomonaga.

Group Commander: Under direct command.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 9 ship-based attack planes and one additional ship-based attack plane from the Akagi.

Base: Hiryu.

Air Engagements: Fierce battles carried out between 1141 and 1146, during which 1 certain and 1 uncertain Grummans were shot down.

Weather in Target Area: Clear; amount of clouds, 4; ceiling, 3,000 meters with some clouds at 500 meters; visibility, 70 kilometers.

Ammunition Expended: 9 type-91 modification-3 torpedoes. One torpedo (that on Akagi's attack plane) was not fired. 860 rounds of 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets.

Results Obtained: Three hits scored on an Enterprise class carrier with torpedoes fired between

1144 and 1146, resulting in a great explosion; a large cruiser of the San Francisco class also exploded.

Losses: Five planes "self-exploded."

(Hiryu fighters)

Date and Weather: As above.

Mission: Direct cover for ship-based attack planes.

Commander: Hiryu Air Officer, Lieut. Tomonaga.

Group Commander: Hiryu Division Comder, Lieut. Mori.

Type and Number of Aircraft: 4 ship-based fighters. (Two additional ship-based fighters from the Kaga.)

Base: Hiryu.

Air Engagements: Fight to the death carried out against about 30 Grummans between 1141 and 1146. Seven of them were definitely brought down while four others were uncertain scores.

Weather in Target Area: Same as above.

Ammunition Expended: 660 20 mm. machine gun bullets; 3,900 7.7 mm. machine gun bullets.

Results Obtained: 7 shot down (4 others, probable).

Losses: 2 planes lost; Chief Yamamoto's plane from the Kaga also lost.

(d)  Action of Cover Units:

(1)  Akagi:

Mission: Direct Cover.

Commander: Air Officer of the Akagi.

Weather in the Vicinity of the Carrier: During the initial stages, cloudy with ceiling about 500 to 1,000 meters; cloud accumulation, 8; visibility, 40 kilometers. During the latter stages, clear with ceiling about 500 to 4,000 meters; cloud accumulation, 1 to 3; visibility, 60 kilometers.

Air Engagements: 0242, 1 flying boat; 0308, 1 flying boat; 0405, 9 twin-engine torpedo planes; 0500, 16 single-engine torpedo and single-engine dive bombing planes; 0623, 18 single-engine torpedo planes; 0640, 14 single-engine torpedo planes; 0706, 15 single-engine dive bombers; 0715, 12 single-engine dive bombers; 1340, 12 single-engine dive bombers.

The above and several dozen B-17's and B-26's were engaged over several hours, and together with fighters from the other carriers, the majority of them were destroyed. From 0726 when they could no longer land on the Akagi, a part of the fighters were transferred to the Hiryu, and carried out their mission in force until 1600 (sundown).

Results Obtained:

(T. N.: Totals do not check)

Losses: of 18 planes used, 7 had hits.

¹ 1 probable.

² Plus 1 probable.

(2)  Kaga:

Mission: As above.

Commander: Air Officer, Kaga.

Weather: As above.

Air Engagements: From 0400 to 0500, about 6 flying boats and 6 twin engine torpedo planes were engaged by coordinated action; one torpedo plane was shot down. From 0515 to 0610, 9 enemy twin engined torpedo planes were attacked through coordinated action, and 2 of them shot down. From 0530 to 0830, 6 single engine torpedo planes and 6 single engine dive bombers were attacked, and through coordinated action 4 of the former and 1 of the latter were shot down. From 0620 to 0830,

about 15 torpedo planes and 5 single engine dive bombers were attacked and 12 of the former and 2 of the latter were shot down. From 0700 to 0830 5 to 6 single engine torpedo planes and 9 single engine dive bombers were attacked and 1 of the former and 6 of the latter were shot down. From 1240 to 1610, (take offs were from the Hiryu) 15 single engine dive bombers and 2 B-17's were attacked and 3 of the former brought down.

Results Obtained:

Losses: 4 planes lost; one other person wou­n­ded.

(3)  Hiryu:

Mission: As above.

Commander: Unknown.

Weather: As above. Air Engagements:

At 0412 9 twin engine torpedo planes attacked and 8 were shot down.

At 0508 9 single engine dive bombers were sighted and 6 were shot down by the air cover. (Three others shot down by AA fire).

At 0512, 6 single engine dive bombers were sighted and two were shot down. (Four were brought down by AA gun fire).

At 0514, two more single engine dive bombers were shot down.

Between 0709 and 0718, 14 single engine torpedo planes were sighted, and nine were shot down (three others by AA fire).

At the same time, 9 Grumman fighters which were escorting the above were engaged, and all 9 were shot down.

At 0715, sighted 10 single engine dive bombers and 3 were shot down (two others accounted for by AA fire).

Between 0718 and 0723, 16 single engine torpedo planes were sighted and 4 were shot down (2 others by AA fire).

Between 1403 and 1430, 13 single engine dive bombers were sighted and 3 were shot down (2 others by AA fire). (Soryu's 13th and 17th Section).

Results Obtained:

Losses: 4 planes lost.

(4)  Soryu:

Mission: As above.

Commander: Unknown.

Weather: As above.

Air Engagements:

At 0405, 9 single engine torpedo planes were attacked and one was brought down through individual action and five by coordinated action.

At 0410, 10 or more, twin engine torpedo planes were attacked and one of them brought down by coordinated action.

At 0450, about 15 single engine dive bombers were attacked and one of them was brought down by individual action and three others by coordinated action.

At 0700, a dozen or so single engined torpedo planes were attacked and two were brought down by individual action and three by coordinated action.

At 0710, 20 single engine torpedo planes with four fighter escorts, were attacked and one was brought down by individual action and two by coordinated action.

At 0715, a dozen or more single engine torpedo planes were attacked, and one by individual action and another by coordinated action were shot down.

At 0715, single engine dive bombers were attacked and through coordinated action, two were set afire and another was seen to trail black smoke (final results of these are uncertain).

At 0715, single engine torpedo planes were attacked and four were brought down by individual action (another one probable), and three by coordinated action.

Results Obtained:

¹ Not included in total.

6.  General Situation at Conclusion of Operations and
     the Commander's Estimate Concerning It

Exceptional fighting was shown by all forces and all ships participating in this operation, and because of it, severe damages were inflicted on the enemy. At the same time, our losses numbered four carriers and the occupation of Midway was not carried out.

The enemy, however, having lost two of their powerful carriers and many of his air personnel, would undoubtedly be unable to effect any large-scale operation in the near future. It is believed that the enemy will surely strike back at some time, and every precaution should be taken against this.

Through this operation, there are some vital lessons learned in aircraft carrier warfare, which should be kept alive. These include such items as the reinforcements of searches for the enemy, flexibility of assembling and dispersing, and the speedy take-offs of friendly aircraft when the enemy is sighted.

7.  Movement and Action Charts

Supplementary Table #1: Track Chart.

Supplementary Table #2: Action Chart.

PART VI. RECOGNITION OF MERITORIOUS
ACTIONS

The men of the plane units which succeeded in severely damaging enemy military installations on Sand and Eastern Islands in spite of persistent enemy fighters and vicious AA fire, are highly commended.

The action of the men of CarDiv 2 (less the Soryu), in succeeding to sink (or severely damage) two of the new and powerful enemy carriers in spite of the fact that the enemy had gained control of the air, must be commended highly. These men well represented our entire forces. The men of the Hiryu air unit (including 1st class P.O. (Air) Yamamoto from the Kaga and 3rd class P.O. (Air) Bando also from the Kaga) who sacrificed themselves by flying into territory which meant sure death and carried out "body crash" tactics, is particularly cited as being exceptional even in the traditionally glorious history of the Imperial Navy.

PART VII. REFERENCE MATERIAL

1.  Battle Lessons (Separate Volume)

2.  Weather Charts (Material lost. Omitted).

3.  Mobile Force's Operation Order #34
(Omitted).